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Since gaining its independence in 1948, South Korea (hereinafter referred to as
Korea) has seen a seemingly endless flow of corruption scandals bring down scores
of elites. Among those who have served time in jail or been exiled are former
presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo; members of many presidential staffs;
and a slew of military officers, politicians, bureaucrats, bankers, businessmen, and
tax collectors.1 While numerous observers professed to be shocked—Shocked!—at
the revelations, in reality such scandals are a recurrent theme in Korean political
history, and the exchange of money for political influence has been not just an open
secret but common knowledge.
For decades the literature on Asian development largely treated the prevalence of
money politics as inconsequential or as peripheral to the "real story" of Korea:
economic growth led by a developmental state composed of technocrats and austere
military generals who emphasized export-oriented industrialization. Growth was so
spectacular that the reality of corruption was concealed or was dismissed out of
hand. And until late November 1997 and the stunning fall of the Korean won,
observers argued that better government in Asia was a prime reason for that region's
spectacular growth.2
Has corruption historically been prevalent in Korea? If so, why? How can we
reconcile the view of an efficient developmental state in Korea before 1997 with
reports of massive corruption and inefficiency in that same country in 1998 and
1999?
Politics is central to the answer. In this study I make two arguments. First, money
politics was extensive in Korea both during and after the high-growth era. Second,
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1. For good overviews of the 1995 scandals, see Ahn 1995; and Kim 1995.
2. For representative views, see Schneider 1998; Evans 1995; Amsden 1989; and Johnson 1987.
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political—not economic—considerations dominated policymaking. Focusing on the
exchange of favors for bribes between state and business, I argue that politics drove
policy choices even at the height of Park Chung-hee's rule, that bureaucrats were not
independent of political interference in setting policy, and that business and political
elites wrestled with each other over who would reap the rents to be had. Money
politics was more extensive in Korea than the conventional wisdom allows. In fact,
so rampant was corruption that we cannot dismiss it; rather, we need to explain it.
This study explains both the past and the present, and it compares the patterns of
money politics in the early post-independence era with those that arose after the
democratic transition in 1987. While during the Park era a balance of power between
businessmen and politicians kept corruption from spinning out of control, the
transition to democracy altered the basic business-state relationship, allowing
business to exert a greater influence than usual over policy decisions. I use the term
"money politics" because it is less normative than "corruption," and also because it
highlights public-private interaction. Money politics subsumes both corrupt prac-
tices such as bribery and legal practices such as campaign finance. Both corruption
and rent seeking are broader terms and can occur at the private-private level as well
as vis-a-vis the state.
The political hypothesis advanced in this study suggests a new direction for our
research about the developmental state. Situated at the intersection of international
relations and comparative politics, and comprising a set of ideas about institutional
arrangements and policy choices, the developmental state perspective held up Asia's
seemingly neutral bureaucracies, effective politicians, and consistent trade policies
as central factors in economic growth.3
The Korean experience suggests broader implications for the study of govern-
ment-business relations in developing countries. Most important, a model of
politics is central to understanding the developmental state. We cannot assume
benevolence on the part of the developmental state. A "hard" view of the develop-
mental state—that the state is neutral, picks winners, and provides public goods
because the civil service is insulated from social influences—is difficult to sustain
empirically. However, even the "soft" view—that governments can have a benefi-
cial effect however government action is attained—needs a political explanation.
The Korean state was developmental—it provided public goods, fostered invest-
ment, and created infrastructure. But this study shows that this was not necessarily
intentional. Corruption was rampant, and the Korean state intervened in the way it
did because doing so was in the interests of a small group of business and political
3. The focus on state institutions includes Weberian bureaucracies that are autonomous from political
and social interference. Among the many who hold this view, Peter Evans has argued that "highly
selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards create commitment and a sense of
corporate coherence." Evans 1995, 12. Alice Amsden also writes that "economic success in Korea
challenges the assumption . . . that government intervention degenerates into 'rent-seeking.'" Amsden
1989, 327. For other specific instances, see Fields 1997, 126; Johnson 1987, 152; and Onis 1991, 114.
The major policy focus is on export-oriented industrialization, where "in direct exchange for subsidies,
the state exacts performance standards from firms." Amsden 1989, 146.
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elites. Producing public goods was often the fortunate by-product of actors com-
peting to gain the private benefits of state resources.
Second, it is unwise to focus on individual policy choices (for example, export-
oriented industrialization) or specific institutional arrangements (the bureaucracy) as
isolated issues. Both institutions and policies are intervening variables, and the
larger institutional environment, in this case the government-business relationship,
affects any specific issue.4 Institutions are more than just the organization of the
state; they can be legal or corporate as well, and there are trade, regulatory, and
financial policies. A distorted picture will emerge if we focus mainly on state
institutions while ignoring industrial organizations, or if we focus on trade policy
while ignoring lax regulatory and financial policies.5 The Korean case shows that
political and economic entrepreneurs are quite resourceful, and that institutional
design or policy choices by themselves are subject to manipulation, evasion, and
modification.6
Third, because the institutional arrangements and policy choices in individual
countries vary greatly, we must also avoid the temptation to look for a universal set
of arrangements or variables that will lead to growth or stagnation. The argument I
will present suggests that to understand the nature of policymaking in developing
countries, we must first understand the particular political challenges that confront
individual leaders and the manner in which business attempts to influence policies.
The strategic allocation of economic policy and benefits is an important political
resource.
Finally, the findings in this article raise questions about the role of domestic-
international linkages in developing countries. Scholars have tended to focus on
export-oriented trade policies when studying developing countries, but the rise of
Korea, accompanied as it was by extensive corruption, leads to questions about how
and why the Korean state had the opportunity to act as it did. International finance,
the actions of international institutions, and the actions of the United States were all
crucial for Korean development. In the study of development, as important as the
study of domestic politics is the study of what international factors sustained the
domestic situation, what international pressures existed, and what external actors
participated in a domestic configuration or allowed it to exist.
I first introduce an informal model of the government-business relationship that
focuses on describing and explaining the exchange of bribes for rents. I then show
that policymaking followed a political—not an economic—rationale during the era
of Park Chung-hee. In the third section I show how the democratic transition in 1987
increased the role of money politics. I conclude by revisiting the developmental state
and offer a tentative explanation for how growth can occur despite corruption.
4. See North 1986; and Williamson 1991.
5. The statist approach implies that if an actor is capable enough, it can design an institutional
structure that will resolve the tendency to shirk. Gary Miller (1992, 3) points out that this view is
mechanistic and seriously underestimates the role of political leadership.
6. Williamson 1985.
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Money Politics, Rent Seeking, and Corruption
I focus on the rent seeking and corruption that occur between public and private
actors. At the heart of the model is the idea that those with excessive power will tend
to abuse it. The dependent variable is the exchange between state and business of
favors for bribes. The independent variable is the relationship between state and
business.
James Buchanan defines rent seeking as "that part of the payment to an owner of
resources over and above that which those resources could command in any
alternative use."7 Thus rents are created when an actor manipulates prices and
causes them to diverge from competitive levels, and the existence of rents can lead
to corruption by various actors attempting to gain access to the rents. By such
manipulation, the actor itself, or some other actor on whose behalf the price
manipulator is acting as an agent, is able to reap "excess profits."8 Rents can be
created in a number of ways, but a principal way is through state intervention.9 The
state uses its power to manipulate prices and markets and to generate rents. For
example, import licenses confer rents by restricting the volume of imported goods
that comes into a country, and thus those actors able to import the restricted goods
will be able to sell those goods at a higher-than-market price, thus obtaining rents.10
By intervening, the government creates incentives for business to attempt to
influence policy decisions, and corruption occurs when businessmen use bribery,
personal connections, or other means in an attempt to influence policy decisions.
The distribution and volume of rents are thus a function of the relative strengths of
the state and the business sector.
The Politics of Corruption
If there were no government distributing rents, there would be no corruption, and
thus a key issue is how to model the government-business relationship. In
examining both the supply and the demand for political corruption, this simplified
model of the government-business relationship necessarily abstracts from a rich
reality.
Following Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, a state can range from coherent to
fractured.'' A state is coherent if it can formulate preferences independent of social
7. Buchanan 1980, 3.
8. See Bardhan 1997; Braguinsky 1996; Nti 1997; and Barzel 1982.
9. See Chang 1994; Rose-Ackerman 1978; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Levi 1988; Milgrom and
Roberts 1990; Bag 1997; and Khan 1996a,b.
10. Corruption is thus a subset of rent seeking. Rents may be allocated purely on the basis of merit,
or they may be allocated toward bribes.
11. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) model different types of government structures, but they avoid
studying how business organization may affect corruption. Susan Rose-Ackerman (1978) discusses types
of state organization similar to those presented in my work, although she does not use the terminology
I employ here.
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influences and if political leaders have internal control over their bureaucrats.12
Although there are many possible configurations of the relationships among political
leaders, bureaucrats, and political organizations (domestic politics: parties, associ-
ations, and so on), for the sake of simplicity I focus on two polar cases. The most
coherent situation exists when political leaders have full control over their political
organizations and their bureaucrats, and in this case leaders actively use domestic
politics as a means of ensuring continued rule. At the other pole, the most fractured
situation exists when leaders survive only tenuously, they engage in constant
conflict with political organizations over the form and content of the state, and
bureaucrats can play off "multiple principals" to their own advantage.13 At the heart
is the question of control.
However, it is the interaction of government and business that is of interest, and
we thus need to understand business organization as well as government organiza-
tion. My view of the business sector builds on the work of Michael Shafer.14 He
argues that the organizational characteristics of the predominant economic sector
(for example, mining or agriculture) have different implications for its relationship
to the state. In sectors with high asset specificity and high production inflexibility,
companies will be less responsive to market signals and less able to adjust quickly
to exogenous shocks, either political or economic. These types of firms will have
more incentive to resist the state's attempts to intervene. Alternatively, in sectors
with low asset specificity, low production inflexibility, and low factor inflexibility,
firms will adjust more easily to exogenous forces.
The approach used here examines business more broadly than Shafer did. In this
model, a strong concentrated business sector is the diversified business group,
comprising well-organized firms that cover many sectors of the economy.15 As Ben
Ross Schneider puts it, "big (and encompassing) is beautiful."16 Under this defini-
tion of diversified firms, companies cover many sectors rather than one, may have
import-competing subsidiaries as well as export-oriented subsidiaries, and may have
both agricultural and urban firms. Given their cross-ownership of various subsid-
iaries and the range of their interests, these firms' interests cannot be neatly
categorized. In addition, the larger that diversified business groups are relative to the
economy as a whole, the more likely they are to attempt to influence government
policy, and the more likely they are to wield political influence. These conglomer-
ates can be differentiated from single-sector, smaller, and less-diversified firms. On
a spectrum we might put individual craftspersons at one end and put Japanese
12. On autonomy and state strength, see Katzenstein 1978. On internal control (agency costs), see
McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; and Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993, chaps. 6 and 7.
13. Spiller 1990.
14. Shafer 1994.
15. Amsden 1989, 8.
16. Schneider 1998, 109.
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Coherent state Fractured state
Concentrated business
sector (small-/V)
Dispersed business
sector (large-N)
I.
Mutual hostages
Type: prisoners' dilemma
collusion
Amount: medium
III.
Predatory state
Type: top-down
Amount: large
II.
Rent seeking
Type: bottom-up
Amount: large
IV.
Laissez-faire
Type: residual
Amount: small
FIGURE l. The four types of corruption
keiretsu, Korean chaebol, Philippine family conglomerates, and Mexican grupos at
the other end.17
We can now build the analogy with respect to politics and corruption, with a
coherent/fractured state along one axis and a concentrated/dispersed business sector
along the other (Figure 1). In this model I take as given the initial distribution of
rights and the type of actors. These are exogenous to the model, and I remain
agnostic as to why and how society came to look a certain way.
Types of Corruption: Bottom-Up or Top-Down
Although the model is a simplified abstraction of the government-business rela-
tionship, it captures the underlying dynamics of how corruption occurs. There are
two analytically distinct types of corruption: the top-down predation by a strong
state on society, and the bottom-up rent seeking of powerful groups that overwhelm
the state's ability to contain and channel their demands. Neither is analytically prior
to the other, and they can occur simultaneously under the right circumstances.
Top-down corruption has best been explicated in the notion of a "predatory"
state.18 The predatory state takes advantage of a dispersed and weak business sector.
Political elites pursue outright expropriation; they solicit "donations" from busi-
nessmen, who in turn either are "shaken down" by the regime or volunteer bribes in
return for favors; and they employ other means as well.19 In contrast, bottom-up
corruption occurs when social actors have the power to overwhelm the state. When
the concentration or strength of the business sector is enough to force concessions
from the state, rent-seeking behavior results. Potential state influence over economic
17. On Latin American conglomerates, see Weyland 1997.
18. Levi 1988.
19. Tilly 1985.
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life is vast, and those businessmen or groups privileged enough to receive low-
interest loans or import quotas will benefit at the expense of others.20 Indeed, a
typical problem in developing countries is the state's ability to resist society's
demands.21 When rent-seeking demands become too onerous, growth is stifled
because the state is incapable of implementing decisions.
The first two possibilities I consider are analogous to either a predatory state or
a rent-seeking business sector. The typical case is that some group or segment of
society has far more access to power than others, as in quadrant III of Figure 1.
When a country has a coherent state and a dispersed business sector, the result is
predatory behavior by the state (top-down behavior) where political elites can scrape
off rents in a predatory manner. Political elites presiding over a coherent state will
have the opportunity to take advantage of a fractured business sector.
Alternatively, when the business sector is concentrated and the state is frag-
mented, as in Cell II, rent seeking results (bottom-up behavior). Here rents created
by the state flow to business, because the latter has colonized the former and
transformed it into a sort of "executive committee." A business sector composed of
strong interest groups may overwhelm the state with its various demands, leading to
either policy incoherence or policy indecision. Many analyses of developing
countries emphasize that the state is a relatively recent, and hence weak, addition to
the political scene. Strong interest groups may be able to capture control of the state
and use the power of the state for their own ends.
Two other possibilities exist. In quadrant IV there are numerous interest groups
and diffuse power within the state. In this situation, no single group could have too
much influence, and the "political market" would come close to clearing. This builds
on Susan Rose-Ackerman's notion that "the role of competitive pressures in
preventing corruption may be an important aspect of a strategy to deter bribery."22
When both state and business are weak, rents are all but eliminated. Neither state nor
business is powerful enough to take advantage of the other, and so exploitation is
difficult. Many of the advanced industrial democracies—at least when compared
with less-developed countries—may approximate this situation. As bureaucrats
compete with one another to offer policy, thus driving the cost of a bribe toward
zero, numerous capitalists also compete with one another for the policy, also driving
the price toward zero. Corruption is lowest in quadrant IV.
The final and most interesting case is quadrant I, where government and business
are equally strong: there is a relatively coherent state but also a small number of
powerful interest groups. In this case, the level of rents is limited and the division
is relatively equitable. The result is "mutual hostages," where the state and powerful
groups may collude with one another but neither has the advantage. Quadrant I
reflects the old saw, "If you owe the bank a little money, the bank owns you. If you
20. For an interesting discussion along these lines, see Milgrom and Roberts 1990; and Chang and
Kozul-Wright 1994.
21. Migdal 1988.
22. Rose-Ackerman 1988, 278. See also Bliss and Di Telia 1997; and Shleifer and Vishny 1993.
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owe the bank a lot of money, you own the bank." This middle position exists when
the state is relatively coherent but the number of powerful interest groups is small.
In this mutual hostage situation both political and economic elites are powerful
enough to harm each other, but the damage each can inflict on the other deters such
actions.23
In quadrant I, rents can be had and corruption can occur, but the level of rents is
constrained by the power of the other group. Small-./V (business concentration)
reduces transaction costs, and hence rent-seeking, because a small-Af eases moni-
toring and enforcement costs. In this situation, although both business and state can
earn rents, the amount will be less than in the polar cases where one group
dominates the other, and more than in the case where both groups are dispersed into
a large number of small actors.
In this sense, strategic interaction between state and business corresponds to a
Prisoner's Dilemma, and cooperation is not automatic. While in the short run either
actor may be better off defecting and gaining all the rents for itself, the other actor
retains the ability to punish defection over time, and thus grudging cooperation may
ensue.24 It is possible that quadrant I could lead to a mutual war of attrition, with the
two sides slugging it out. However, even without active cooperation, the power of
the other side will limit exploitation. In Korea, Park initially tried to take advantage
of the business sector but was unable to do so.25
Thus, the least corruption would occur in situations where both state and business
are weak and disorganized, for neither group could take advantage of the other, and
all the groups would compete against each other, driving the price of corruption
close to zero. The most corruption would occur when one side, either state or
business, is coherent. A middle position exists when both state and business are
strong and can take partial but not total advantage of each other.26
Measurement
The theoretical concepts in this article are widely accepted and used in the social
sciences, even though the difficulty in measuring them is also widely acknowl-
edged.27 Recognizing this difficulty, in this study I focus on the polar cases, in an
attempt to lay out the ranges of the variables and test the model's plausibility.
Measuring the dependent variables of corruption and influence-peddling is
difficult. By their very nature these are acts that actors wish to keep hidden.
Although scholars have used polls of perceptions of corruption as evidence, have
23. This is based on the idea of bilateral monopoly. See Kreps 1990, 551-73. See also Blair,
Kaserman, and Romano 1989.
24. Axelrod 1984.
25. The 1961 "Illicit Wealth Accumulation Act," or bujong chukje-an, is an example of this. For more,
see Kang forthcoming.
26. The evidence in this article fills in quadrants I and II. For comparative work that uses the
Philippines to examine all four quadrants in the matrix, see Kang 2002.
27. See Krasner 1978, especially chap. 1.
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traced a single pattern of corruption, or have relied on corruption scandals, there is
no comprehensive indicator of corruption.28 While conclusive measures do not
exist, a variety of indicators give us a sense of the size and pattern of corruption.29
Occasional scandals reveal the pattern of influence. Estimates of campaign spend-
ing, kickbacks, and secret funds are useful first approximations. Since precise
measurement is difficult, in this study I assess only whether corruption is low,
medium, or high.
Measuring the independent variables is only marginally easier. To measure the
strength of the business sector, I focus on a series of indicators. Firms' value added
as a proportion of gross domestic product (GDP) indicates their market and political
power, and the composition and concentration of bank loans indicates their vulner-
ability to the state. To measure state coherence and low agency costs, I rely mainly
on detailed case studies that follow the process of policymaking, and I do not
attempt to provide a single quantifiable measure for the variables. Case studies can
reveal whether leaders act on their parties' politics and domestic politics, or whether
they respond to them. Process tracing of both policy decisions and institutional
origins can reveal whether there is agency slack between leaders and bureaucrats.
Money Politics and the Developmental State
The series of institutional changes made under the Park Chung-hee regime (1961—
79) is often used as the starting point of the high-growth era. Yet the Park regime
was hardly de-politicized, and in fact money politics was pervasive. Not only was
there extensive corruption, but political connections overrode economic criteria and
allowed for overcapacity and bail-outs of indebted and poorly managed firms. The
basic process was simple: Business and political elites exchanged bribes for political
favors. Politicians used these political funds to buy votes and to serve basic greed.
Businessmen used the rents from cheap capital to expand as rapidly as possible, thus
ensuring their continued political and economic importance. Development and
money politics proceeded hand in hand.
Politicians: The Demand for Political Funds
Under Park the need for funds for electoral and political purposes was extensive.
The election laws themselves, imposed by the military junta, restricted political
activities so severely that, as Alexander Kim notes, "no party could be effective
unless it had many wealthy members, or unless it could secure secret, illegal
28. Daniel Treisman (1997) uses the Transparency International index of perceived corruption as his
measure of actual corruption; Robert Wade (1985) traces the sale of office in India; and Chalmers
Johnson (1986) follows the corruption scandals in Japan. Other theoretically informed empirical work
includes Morris 1991; Doner 1997; Kiser and Tong 1992; Levy 1995; and Wedeman 1999.
29. See Hutchcroft 2000; and Sandholtz and Koetzle 1998.
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donations—something the ruling party could do, but which an opposition party
would find immensely difficult."30 These donations were known as bi-chagum, or
"secret funds." The DRP (Minju Gonghwa Dang, or Democratic Republican Party)
not only required a large staff and budget but also bought votes through the
traditional huwonhoi (personal vote) system—throwing parties, creating hiking
clubs, and attending weddings and holiday festivities. Park and the DRP organized
society through a number of means. The largest was the People's Movement for
National Reconstruction (Kuk-To Gonsol Dan). Units were established down to the
village level throughout Korea, and at one point the organization was reported to
have 3.9 million members.31 Park's coalitional base consisted of an extensive and
expensive party apparatus that organized and controlled society and provided
side-payments to Park's constituents. While the DRP won the southern and rural
districts, the opposition tended to win in the cities, a phenomenon that came to be
known as yochon-yado ("The ruling party is strong in the provinces, the opposition
is strong in the cities."). As the Korean economy expanded, money began to slosh
through the system at an unprecedented rate.
According to the financial report of the Central Election Management Committee,
the annual costs of running the DRP were as high as $4.5 billion in the 1960s, or $35
million won (at 130 won to a U.S. dollar) in 1965.32 The DRP secretariat alone was
estimated to have 1,300 staff members, and the estimated cost of operating just the
secretariat was $700,000 per month.33 During the 1963 election, for example, the
DRP was estimated to have spent 76.9 percent of total campaign spending, and
during the 1967 elections an estimated $40 million was spent buying votes.34
To fund their operations, political elites took massive donations from the chaebol
in return for loans and sweetheart deals. Under Park this financial system of
exchanging policy for bribes became quasi-institutionalized. Leading members of
the DRP were in charge of political fundraising, the two most important persons
being Kim Sung-Kon and Kim Jin-man.35 These members of Park's inner circle had
clear fundraising duties: One dealt with personal connections, another with the
parties, and others with big business.
Businessmen often called "voluntary" donations junjoseh, or "quasi-taxes."36 For
example, the Saemaul Undong was a 1970s political organization whose aim was to
improve the quality of rural life, but it was also a home for embezzlement, nepotism,
and cronyism. Hyundai donated 7.4 billion won to the cause in 1971-75, Samsung
30. Kim 1975, 245.
31. Kim 1971, 158.
32. Throughout this article I have intermixed both Korean won and the U.S. equivalents. I use U.S.
dollars to provide some sense of the scale and Korean won to give the specific amount.
33. See Park 1967; and Kim 1975.
34. Kim and Park 1968, 88.
35. Lee 1987.
36. Although much of these quasi-taxes was accountable and did not derive directly from corruption,
the taxes were part of the government-business relationship and hence are important to understanding the
political process.
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TABLE 1. Selected chaebol political contributions (in billions of won)
Chaebol, ranked by
sales, 1992
1. Hyundai
2. Samsung
3. LG
4. Daewoo
5. SK
6. Ssangyong
7. Hanjin
8. Korea-Explosives
9. Hyosung
10. Dongkuk
11. Kia
12. Doosan
13. Lotte
14. Kolong
15. Donga
16. Hanil
17. Daelim
18. Kumho
19. Dongbu
20. Sammi
21. Poongsan
22. Hanbo
Total
Saemaul
Undong
(Park,
Chun)
7.4
7.8
6.7
4.85
5.8
2.7
4.5
1.1
0.8
2.1
3.6
1.1
3.9
0.75
1.0
5.7
3.3
1.9
2.6
1.7
2.5
2.2
74.0
Sae
Sedae
Yukyong
Hoi
(Park)
2.5
2.0
0.5
0.3
1.0
—
0.7
0.4
0.2
—
—
—
0.02
—
1.0
0.6
0.5
0.05
0.1
0.3
—
0.03
10.2
Recipient of contribution
Sae Sedae Simjang
Foundation (Park)
3.0
1.0
0.3
0.8
—
—
1.0
0.8
0.2
2.2
—
0.87
—
—
1.8
—
—
—
—
—
—
11.97
Hhae
Foundation
(Chun)
5.15
4.5
3.0
4.0
2.8
1.5
2.2
1.5
0.9
1.45
0.7
0.9
2.0
0.7
1.3
0.9
1.3
1.0
0.3
—
0.8
—
36.9
DJP
funds
(Chun)
0.52
0.9
1.3
0.7
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.6
1.0
—
0.2
0.4
—
1.3
1.5
1.2
0.4
0.6
0.4
0.7
14.72
Total
18.57
16.2
11.8
10.65
10.6
5.0
9.0
4.2
2.3
6.35
5.3
2.0
6.99
1.85
3.3
10.3
6.6
4.15
3.4
2.6
3.7
2.93
147.79
Rank in
giving
1
2
3
4
5
12
7
13
20
10
11
21
8
22
17
6
9
14
16
19
15
18
Source: Han and Ahn 1994, 207.
donated 7.8 billion, LG 6.7 billion, and Daewoo 4.85 billion (Table 1). Even if the
chaebol donations were used for the intended humanitarian purpose, such donations
were certainly part of the larger web of money politics. The fact remained that if
businessmen did not provide politicians with sufficient funds when asked, the Bank
of Korea called in their loans, or they suffered a tax audit, or their subsidy
application was denied. The best example of this is Kukje's refusal to make
"voluntary" donations to the Ilhae foundation, and Chun Doo-hwan's subsequent
dismemberment of the company.37 In 1985 the Kukje group, with 38,000 employ-
ees, was the seventh-largest chaebol in Korea and, like all chaebol, was highly
leveraged with significant loans from the government. However, Kukje's president,
37. Kang 1995, 560-61.
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Yang Chung-mo, had seriously offended President Chun Doo-hwan by refusing to
contribute significant sums to quasi-governmental organizations such as the Ilhae
Foundation38 and the Saemaul Undong ("New Village Movement"). As a result, the
state refused to loan money to Kukje and refused to honor its checks. Within weeks
Kukje could not service its debt and had to declare bankruptcy.39
Distributive coalitional politics was one major reason for the prevalence of
political funds. However, political funds had another major "use": to satisfy greed.
After Park's death, half a million dollars were found in his personal safe. Kim
Jong-pil reportedly amassed more than $50 million (at 1979 prices), including a
5,000-acre ranch, a tangerine orchard, a 2,100-head dairy farm in Chungchong-do,
a newspaper company in Seoul, and over 3.7 billion won ($36 million) in real estate.
Kim also reportedly had 4 billion won in thirty-four secret bank accounts, a 1.1
kilogram gold sword, a "huge collection" of antiques and jewelry, and $2.5 million
in "cooperation fees" from companies.40
Lee Hu-rak, who had been the presidential chief of staff, Blue House, accumu-
lated $40 million. Oh Won-Chul, the architect of the Heavy and Chemical Indus-
trialization Plan (HCIP), accumulated wealth of at least $4.5 million. Former Army
Chief of Staff Lee Se Ho had $ 18.5 million, much of it from embezzling government
funds. Former Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly Kim Jin-man had $17
million in assets; Kim Jong-pil's brother Kim Jong Nak had $15 million, presiden-
tial bodyguard "Pistol" Park Chong-kyu had $12.8 million, and former prime
ministerial aide Lee Pyong-Hi had $4 million.41 U.S. congressional staffer Edward
Baker remarked after the 1977 investigation into Korean-American affairs, "One
has to conclude that either Park Chung-hee was an idiot or he was condoning
outrageous criminal behavior. Whether Park was putting money in his pocket or not,
he knew he was heading a criminal enterprise."42
Businessmen: The Supply of Funds in Return for Favors
Given the Korean state's total control over the financial sector in the 1960s and
1970s, businesses were naturally interested in gaining access to the enormous rents
that accrued to a chaebol if it received a low-interest-rate loan. The state's inability
to control firms and their growth led to endemic overcapacity. Firms rushed
willy-nilly to expand at all costs, whether or not it was economically feasible. The
result was that in most major sectors of the economy there was excess capacity and
overlapping and duplication of efforts as each chaebol tried to be the biggest.
Rents in the form of U.S. aid, allocation of foreign and domestic bank loans,
import licenses, and other policy decisions were based on a political funds system
38. The name given to this research foundation, created by Chun Doo Hwan, was Chun's pseudonym.
39. See Clifford 1994, 208-12; Christian Science Monitor, 28 March 1985, 23; and Wall Street
Journal, 2 February 1985, 32(W).
40. See Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters 1980; Chosun llbo, 19 June 1980; and Oh 1986, 42.
41. Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters 1980.
42. Clifford 1994, 89.
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TABLE 2. Bank loans to chaebol as
Chaebol company
Panbon Bangjik (cotton spinning)
Samho Bangjik (cotton spinning)
Hwashin
Kumsung Bangjik (former LG)
Samsung Merchandising
Daehan Yanghoe (cement)
Daehan Chebun (milling)
Kukdong Gonsol (construction)
Daehan Sanop (industry)
Total
Amount of bank bill issuing
Currency circulation
Total amount of loans given by banks
of August 1964 (in millions
Amount of loans
5,556
3,717
3,153
2,680
829
754
396
383
132
17,600
21,400
40,900
46,200
of won)
% of total
82%
43%
38%
Source: Data from Park 1982, 199.
that required donations from the capitalists. During the 1960s, the expected kick-
back became normalized at between 10 and 20 percent of the loan.43 Park
Byung-yoon points out that as early in Park's rule as 1964, 38 percent of total bank
loans—43 percent of Ml money supply—was given to only nine chaebol, all of
which had family members in powerful positions in the ruling party or in the
bureaucracy (see Table 2).44
Indeed, whether or not a market rationale existed for expansion of firms'
activities, there certainly was a rationale for rent seeking when combined with the
proper political connections. The Park era, far from limiting and controlling the
expansion of chaebol, saw the opposite result. Firms rushed headlong into expan-
sion, both to justify their continued receipt of cheap money and to make themselves
so large that the government would have no choice but to keep supplying them with
funds—a situation known as "moral hazard." Table 3 shows the year of incorpo-
ration or establishment of subsidiary companies for the ten largest chaebol in 1984.
Sixty percent of chaebol expansion occurred during the 1970s, resulting in tremen-
dous overcapacity.
The car industry serves as a good example. Despite numerous attempts to
rationalize the automobile industry and force domestic firms to concentrate on core
competencies, Korea throughout the 1970s had more capacity and more players than
the Economic Planning Board (EPB) considered economically feasible. In 1969
Hyundai Motors operated at 49 percent of capacity, and in 1972 at only 25.8 percent
43. Woo 1991, 108.
44. Park 1982, 210.
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TABLE 3. Year of incorporation or establishment of subsidiary companies of the
ten largest chaebol as of 1984
Samsung
Hyundai
LG
Daewoo
Sunkyung
Ssangyong
Korea-
Explosives
Kukje
Hanjin
Hyosung
Total
Percentage of
total
No. of
subsidiaries
in chaebol
30
32
24
24
14
14
18
18
12
20
206
Prior to 1950
1
1
1
0
0
2
0
1
1
1
8
4%
1950-59
3
2
2
0
1
1
1
0
0
2
12
6%
1960-69
6
4
5
0
1
3
5
0
5
5
34
18%
1970-79
11
20
10
21
7
6
8
13
6
12
114
60%
1980-84
8
1
3
3
3
2
3
0
0
0
23
12%
Information
unavailable
1
4
3
0
2
0
1
4
0
0
15
Source: Kuk 1995, 116.
of capacity. The rest of the industry was no better. Finally, between August and
October of 1980, on an EPB initiative, the Korean government ordered the
automobile industry to "merge by decree." The plan was to merge Hyundai Motors
with Daewoo's Saehan subsidiary and produce passenger cars, while forcing Kia
Industries out of the passenger car market, but the plan failed.45 Park Byung-yoon
wrote that industry saw the government as ineffective, and "the government could
not have done anything to make the business community comply with its pro-
gram."46
The incentive to become heavily indebted and to focus on expansion instead of
efficiency had predictable results: Firms borrowed whether they needed to or not.
Many firms expanded far too quickly and without adequate management expertise
or planning. But because there were so few chaebol, it was politically dangerous to
allow them to fail. As a result, the Korean state did bail out weak companies, and
it rewarded political relationships, not necessarily economic success. Far from
imposing performance standards, the Korean government was continually forced to
bail out inefficient firms that had overextended themselves.
Indeed, as far back as 1971 the United States was alerting Korea to the problems
it faced because of the personalistic manner in which it disbursed the foreign aid and
45. Lew 1992, chap. 5. See also Choi 1987, 129-30.
46. See Park 1979; and Lew 1992, 176.
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loans it received. At a 30 March 1971 meeting between officials from the Economic
Planning and the U.S. Treasury and State Department the U.S. officials stressed that
"insolvent industries, caused by political favoritism in earlier years, represented a
major problem. They stressed that foreign banks looked closely at the prevalence of
favoritism towards basically unsound companies."47 However, Korea took no action
until 3 August 1972, when, instead of rationalizing poorly performing and heavily
indebted firms, Park Chung-hee engaged in a massive bailout of those companies.
Designed to alleviate the curb market, the bailout disproportionately helped more
heavily indebted firms. The decree essentially placed a moratorium on new loans,
and old loans were rescheduled to be paid back over five years, after a three-year
grace period, with a substantially lower interest rate.48
Extensive political connections overrode economic considerations. In the context
of an authoritarian regime that handed out favors selectively, size was an advantage.
A capitalist who had already acquired a license to invest in a project was at a great
advantage in acquiring further credit allocation from the government. Since only a
small number of capitalists had shown their ability to produce in the past, they stood
out.49
Mutual Hostages
Money politics remained constrained because Korean elites existed in a mutual
hostage situation where neither political elites nor economic elites could take
excessive advantage of the other. This balance of power allowed them to pursue
corrupt activities, but it also limited the chances for excessive advantage. Govern-
ment intervention was subject to political influence in a number of ways that
reduced both rent-seeking by entrepreneurs and transaction costs for the politicians
and bureaucrats involved in monitoring the policy process.
While the "strong state" has been the focus of much of the literature, the
surprising strength of the business sector has received less attention. State control
over the financial sector had enormous consequences for the organization and
conduct of business in Korea.50 Since Korean companies were highly leveraged,
they were vulnerable to state control. Paradoxically, this weakness became a source
of strength in relation to the state. The Park regime actively encouraged the
centralization and enhancement of economic power in the chaebol. From Park's
initial decision in 1961 to pardon the "illicit wealth accumulators" to the bailout of
highly leveraged firms on 3 August 1972, to the 1976 decision to promote General
Trading Companies,51 state policy has continuously encouraged the rise of the
chaebol.
47. U.S. House of Representatives 1978, 121.
48. See Kyunghyang Ilbo, 31 August 1991; and Economic Planning Board 1983, 18.
49. Park 1967, 207.
50. Jones and Sakong 1980.
51. Cho 1987.
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TABLE 4. Mutual hostages, part I: Chaebol value-added, 1973-75 (percentage
of nonagricultural GDP)
Chaebol (ranking) 1973 1974 1975
Top 5 5.1% 5.6% 7.1%
Top 10 7.9% 8.5% 10.7%
Top 20 10.9% 11.8% 14.7%
Source: Jones and Sakong 1980, 268.
TABLE 5. Mutual hostages, part II: Debt/equity ratio of the top thirty Korean
chaebol, 1971-90
1971-80 1981-85 1986-1990
365.9% 374.7% 295.8%
Source: Bank of Korea, Statistics Division (Chosabu), 21 October 1998.
If the state has control over various policy instruments, can control or manipulate
the judiciary and the legislature, and can redesign at will the terms of any agreement
it makes, the problem will be that no action it takes will be credible. The farsighted
ruler who realizes that he is at risk will take action to infuse greater confidence. One
way the state can make a believable commitment to various policy initiatives is by
fostering domestic sources of power in specific areas—power centers that would
later prove to be tremendously costly to overturn.
By encouraging the formation of large conglomerates that accounted for large
percentages of the Korean economy, the state and the chaebol in effect became
mutual hostages (quadrant I of Figure 1). Tables 4 and 5 show that while each
needed the other, neither was able to gain the upper hand, and thus state and chaebol
were forced to work together.52
Korea under Park approximated quadrant I of Figure 1 quite closely. The
government's control over capital made any threat to cut off credit to the chaebol
lack credibility, because all actors knew that it would hurt the regime as much as it
would hurt the chaebol. A flow of political payoffs to politicians strengthened this
pipeline of easy money. For politicians, the need for political funds to run elections
and other political activities, as well as a natural proclivity toward greed, gave the
government no incentive to sanction companies unless the business managers were
52. Lew 1992.
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utterly incompetent. Bad loans to good friends were supported by external aid and
loans. What kept the process from spinning out of control was the balance of power
between political and economic elites. While both benefited from the close ties,
neither was able to dominate the other. This is analogous to a Prisoner's Dilemma:
Both sides would prefer to defect, but they are restrained from doing so by the other
side's ability to respond in kind, and hence a form of stability ensues. In Korea the
exchange of such hostages led to an uneasy balance of constrained collusion that
existed throughout the period of high growth.
Democracy Increased the Role of Money Politics After 1987
The model proposed here is dynamic, and the initial configuration of state and
business sets out the development path. Over time this path itself leads to changes
in both the composition and the power of the actors involved. The chaebol moved
quickly up the technology chain, diversifying and becoming larger and more
complex. An increasingly wealthy middle class, long chafing under the collusive ties
between state and chaebol, now came to the fore as a politically influential group.
However, the most significant change was the 1987 democratic transition.53 A
country's shift from authoritarian institutions to democratic ones will have different
results depending on the relationship between state and business (Figure 2). In
Korea, where both the state and business were strong, a shift to democratic
institutions benefited business more than the state—the state was weakened by the
imposition of democratic processes. Democratization does not change the business
sector's generally high demand for rents, but it does affect the supply. With more
politicians competing on the supply side, fewer limits were placed on the behavior
of the business sector.
Korea's position moved from one of government and business as mutual hostages
(quadrant I) to one of predominance by rent-seeking business (quadrant II).
Democratization led to increased demands for political payoffs, as politicians began
to genuinely compete for electoral support, and to a decrease in the state's ability to
resist or contain the demands of the business sector. The small number of massive
Korean firms, unrestrained by domestic market forces because of their size, made
increasingly risky decisions.
The democratic transition had two major implications for the pattern of money
politics in Korea. First, an increase in demand for political payoffs shifted the
advantage to business. Second, Korea's legal and corporate institutions remained
underdeveloped even in the 1990s and allowed a continued business focus on
debt-led investment in overcapacity and overdiversification.
53. Haggard and Kaufman 1995.
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Coherent state Fractured state
Concentrated business
sector (small-TV)
Dispersed business
sector (large-Af)
I.
Mutual hostages
Korea pre-1987
III.
Predatory state
II.
Rent seeking
Korea post-1987
IV.
Laissez-faire
FIGURE 2. The changing relationship between business and the state in the 1980s
Increased Demand for Political Payoffs
The scandals of the late Kim administration showed that the transition to democratic
rule by no means reduced the ability of rent-seeking groups to exercise political
influence; indeed, the demand for campaign funds and secret funds (songo-chagum
and bi-chagum) has probably increased. One reason that Kim Dae-jung and Kim
Young-sam are no different from previous political elites in their manner of political
fundraising and their appetite for it is that the costs of winning elections and running
a party are immense.
Table 6 gives estimates of spending on elections from 1981 through 1997. Most
striking is the vast expansion in spending after 1987. During the 11th National
Assembly election (1981) under Chun, a popular phrase was "ship-dang, gurak,"
which roughly translated means "Expenditures of 1 billion won [$1.3 million] win
the seat, expenditures of 900 million won [$1.2 million] will lose."54 By the 14th
National Assembly election (1992), the phrase had become "iship-dang, shimnak"
or "Expenditures of 2 billion won [$2.6 million] win the seat, expenditures of 1
billion won [$1.3 million] will lose."55
The total cost of the National Assembly and presidential campaigns of 1992 was
estimated at 5 trillion won ($5.1 billion) or the equivalent of 16 percent of the
government's annual budget.56 However, in twenty days of legal campaigning,
National Assembly campaign expenditures were capped at 83 million won
($105,000). For the 1996 National Assembly campaign it was estimated that each
candidate spent 1.2 billion won ($1.5 million) during that period, not including
expenditures before the legal campaign. In addition, the cost of running an office
54. Park 1989, 290.
55. Ku 1999, 57.
56. Yang 1997, 31.
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TABLE 6. Estimates of election spending, 1981-97
Election Estimate of actual expenses Officially reported expenses
1981 National Assembly
(11th)
1985 National Assembly
(12th)
1987 Presidential
1988 National Assembly
(13th)
1992 Presidential
1992 National Assembly
(14th)
1996 National Assembly
(15th)
1997 Presidential
Total: 200-300 billion won
($266-400 million)
500 million—1 billion won per
candidate
Total: 200-300 billion won
($266-400 million)
Total: 443 billion won ($590
million)
Roh: at least 200 billion won
($266 million) from Chun
Total: 400-500 billion won
($533-666 million)
Government: 500 million-1
billion won per candidate
Opposition: 200-300 million
won per candidate
Total: 2 trillion won ($2.7
billion)
YS: 1 trillion won ($1.3
billion)
JP: 30 billion won ($40
million)
Total: 1 trillion won ($1.3
billion)
Total: >1 trillion won ($1.3
billion)
1-2 billion won ($1.3-2.6
million) per candidate
Total: 2 trillion won ($2.7
billion)
31.7 billion won ($45.2 million)
N.A.
13.9 billion won ($18.5 million)
N.A.
YS: 28.4 billion won ($37.8 million)
N.A.
NKP: 6.45 billion won total ($8.5
million)
Kukmin Hoiui (DJ): 6.43 billion won
($8.4 million)
Jaminyon (JP): 6.29 billion won
($8.35 million)
DJ: 26 billion won ($34.6 million)
Sources: Ku 1999, 55-59; Park 1989, 300; Yoon 1995, 137-39; Lee 1997; Chosun Ilbo, 20 Febru-
ary 1998, 2; Dongo Ilbo, 12 April 1998, 4; and Kim 1998.
Note: YS = Kim Young-Sam; DJ = Kim Dae-Jung; JP = Kim Jong-pil; NKP = New Korea
party.
over four years is estimated to be 4.8 billion won ($6 million)—so a winner needs
6 billion won ($7-8 million) just to win and operate a normal National Assembly
seat.57
Normal party expenditures are also enormous. The Korean phrase oribbal ("duck
feet") describes the situation: On the surface decorum is maintained, while below
the surface the parties scramble like mad to raise funds. In the 1970s Park's Blue
57. Park 1992, 271.
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TABLE 7. Estimates of quasi-taxes for the ten largest chaebol, 1980-87
Year
1980
1981
1984
1985
1986
1987
Total
Quasi-taxes
(in millions of won)
219.6
345.9
710.0
683.9
1,020.4
988.3
3,968.1
Quasi-taxes
(% of total sales)
0.48
0.55
0.85
0.77
0.82
0.74
Sources: Kim 1988, 11; and Choi 1986, 11.
House disbursed approximately 10 billion won ($20 million) each year.58 After
democratization, each local district had expenses of approximately 10 million won
($13,000) per month, meaning that annual party expenditures in the early 1990s
were approximately $39 million.59 Over five years, Roh reportedly gave at least 180
billion won ($240 million) to his political party for normal operating expenses and
disbursed 30 billion won ($40 million) to local constituencies four times a year,
while personally raising at least $800 million in secret funds.60 In 1996 political
parties officially reported raising 315 billion won ($420 million).61 As one observer
noted, "if they admit to raising 315 billion won, we know the actual total must be
far greater."62 In comparison, in the United States, a country with six times the
population and an economy fifteen times larger, the Republican party's fundraising
goal in 2000 was $179 million.
Political funds in Korea came from business. Tables 7 and 8 compare estimates
for quasi-taxes paid by business for the periods 1980-87 and 1994-98. Although
quasi-taxes are largely accountable, they are still imposed in a coercive manner and
are part of the overall government-business relationship. To not make "voluntary"
donations is to risk payback in the form of tax audits or rejected loan applications,
for example. Total estimated quasi-taxes for 1980-87 were 3.9 billion won, and the
estimated total for 1994-98 was 4.2 trillion won. Part of this increase is due to the
increased size of both the economy and the largest chaebol, but neither the economy
nor the chaebol expanded a thousandfold over the decade. Additionally, the figures
for quasi-taxes include neither entertainment expenses nor individual donations.
According to the National Tax Administration, between 1988 and 1992 the top
58. Han and Ahn 1994, 205.
59. Yoon 1995, 138.
60. See Yoon 1995, 138; and Ha 1998, 230.
61. Donga llbo, 12 April 1998, 4.
62. Ibid.
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TABLE 8. Estimates of quasi-taxes for ten largest chaebol, 1994-98
Company
Samsung
Hyundai
LG
Daewoo
SK
Hanjin
Hanhwa
Kumho
Ssangyong
Lotte
Total
Quasi-taxes
(in billions of won)
1,217.3
702
623.9
572.6
375.6
268.6
152.6
135.1
114.9
74.1
4,236.7
Quasi-taxes
(% of net profits)
25.0
37.2
27.1
78.5
18.7
N.A.
> 100.0
> 100.0
N.A.
N.A.
Source: Kangwon Hbo, 18 August 1999, 1.
thirty chaebol spent approximately $1.4 billion for banquets and entertainment and
only $215 million for research and development.63
Indeed, Hyundai founder Chung Jo-yong said, "I personally handed to the ruler
about 1 billion won yearly during the 3rd Republic [Park], about 5 billion won
yearly during the 5th Republic [Chun], and 10 billion won yearly in the 6th Republic
[Roh]."64 With the coming of democracy, Roh Tae-woo's regime had by 1988
instituted a system in which over 200 dojang ("stamps," or bureaucratic approvals)
had to be obtained in order to undertake any project in South Korea. Thus, even the
smallest bureaucrat now had veto power, and the scale of the economy was much
larger. As one businessman lamented to me, "By the late 1980s Roh and later YS
[Kim Young-sam] had established so much 'democracy' that I needed over 100
envelopes [bribes] in order to build a factory last year. That never occurred under
Park or Chun—they eliminated the middleman, and while you had to pay for access,
you could do it at the top levels, and not worry so much about the bureaucracy."65
Under Kim Young-sam the trend continued. By the time of the collapse of the
chaebol Hanbo in 1997, between 1.5 and 2 trillion won (over $1 billion) had
disappeared from Hanbo's accounts, most likely ending up in the pockets of political
or business elites.66 In 1999 the market research firm Taylor Nelson Sofres PLC
polled 1,250 middle-class, upper-income Korean decision makers, mostly white-
collar or self-employed urban men. Of the five categories considered—entertain-
63. Coalition for Social Justice/Citizen's Coalition for Economic Justice 1993, 272.
64. Chosun llbo, 9 January 1992, 3
65. In Korea bribes and honoraria are traditionally passed to their recipients in white envelopes. See
also Ha 1998, 237-39.
66. Yoon 1997, 201.
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TABLE 9. Value added to GNP by Korea's four largest chaebol, 1986-95
(percentage)
Hyundai
Samsung
LG
Daewoo
Total
1986
1.9
1.2
1.2
1.4
5.7
1987
1.9
1.3
1.2
1.3
5.7
1988
1.9
1.6
1.3
1.1
5.9
1989
2.1
2.2
1.4
1.2
6.9
1990
2.0
2.0
1.4
1.2
6.6
1991
2.2
1.8
1.4
1.2
6.6
1992
2.3
1.9
1.6
1.2
7.0
1993
2.3
2.0
1.6
1.3
7.2
1994
2.4
2.4
1.8
1.2
7.8
1995
2.9
3.1
2.1
1.2
9.3
Source: Choi 1997, 41.
ment, law enforcement, government officials, business, and education—respondents
said that only the education sector was less corrupt than it was five years earlier. For
business generally, 42 percent of respondents said the level of corruption was the
same as before, and 32 percent said it was worse.67
This exchange allowed greater business influence in policymaking, and the
chaebol continued to expand at the expense of small and medium-sized industries.
Although many assumed that globalization and liberalization would reduce rent
seeking and the power of the chaebol, the opposite might very well be the case.
Table 9 shows that although in 1986 the four largest chaebol added 5.7 percent to
Korea's GNP, by 1995 their share had grown to 9.3 percent of value added to GNP.
Unless liberalization is matched by stringent regulatory oversight that limits
collusive practices and the exercise of market power, it can provide new opportu-
nities for large firms to buy favorable policy. While measures to rein in the chaebol
are popular politically, because of government-business ties such policies were
unsustainable even after 1997.
Weak Legal and Corporate Institutions
Not only did the number of opportunities for business to influence government
increase after democratization; the importance of personal relationships (inmaek) in
legal and corporate institutions also increased. A historically weak legal environ-
ment—and the corresponding importance of personal ties—creates an environment
where the founder/chairman can control a vast array of subsidiaries while having
little or no formal title to them and can evade or influence government policy.68
Within this institutional environment, the rule of law in Korea has been vague and
has seldom been enforced. Until 1997, chaebol regulations consisted of a credit
67. Wall Street Journal, 31 December 1999.
68. Donga Ilbo, 27 March 1998, 2.
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control system, the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), and other
policies. Direct cross-shareholdings between any two subsidiaries of each of the
thirty largest conglomerates, as well as cross-loan guarantees, were prohibited.
However, legislation by itself is no guarantee of solid institutions, nor does it
guarantee equal treatment under the law. Kim Jong-Seok notes that
Korean regulations are not just pervasive and large in number, but also highly
judgmental and vague, so that most of the decisions and interpretations of the
regulations are left with the regulators themselves. . . . The subsequent opaque
procedures, ambiguous rules, and unpredictable results create total instability
for businesses in Korea. Under such regulatory circumstances, both regulators
and regulatees know that the regulation cannot be enforced as written, and thus
the regulatees have a strong incentive to lobby the regulators to circumvent
enforcement.69
As an example of how loose Korean corporate governance has been, it was only in
1993 (for bank accounts) and 1995 (for real estate) that the government outlawed the
system of "false names." Since the 1960s, it had been possible to register a false
name (a grandmother, "Mr. Kim," and so on) and use it to buy stock, engage in land
speculation, and transfer money, thus avoiding taxes and circumventing regulations
that prohibited land speculation and imposed corporate shareholder limits. Indeed,
when this system was outlawed by then-president Kim Young-sam, there was a
horrific outcry from the business community. The Ministry of Finance estimated
that in 1993 politicians and businessmen used over one million false names,
accounting for over 30 trillion won ($40 billion) in assets.
In this fluid institutional environment, personal ties between chaebol and politi-
cians—always important—have become even more critical to business success. The
transition to democracy did not change this need. Rather, the 1990s saw expanded
opportunities for personal connections, influence peddling, and a "bigger is better"
mentality. Business concentration continued to increase, while cross-holding own-
ership remained a standard Korean business practice.
Instead of being limited to their "core competencies," the chaebol increasingly
overlapped in their efforts in the automotive, electronic, and financial sectors. Why
did this happen? Because neither Kim Young-sam nor Roh before him coupled their
executive orders with realistic incentives for the chaebol to comply. Banks would
not invest in any firms aside from the chaebol, which were the only internationally
competitive domestic firms. In addition, the rest of the government bureaucracy—
which had been knee-deep in big business-government relations—was also not
convinced that a policy of limiting the chaebol would truly be successful. Thus,
because there has been no credible shift in government policy, traditional govern-
ment-business practices have continued.
This has served the political purposes of growth and protection. Much of the
pressure for "structural adjustment," therefore, stems from this practice rooted in the
69. Kim 1996, 11.
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TABLE 10. Level of indebtedness of Korean chaebol, 1996
Chaebol (rank in sales)
Hyundai (1)
Samsung (2)
LG(3)
Daewoo (4)
Halla (12)
Sammi (23)
Hanil (29)
lst-4th largest chaebol
5th-10th largest chaebol
1 lth-30th largest chaebol
Debt/equity ratio (%)
373.29
207.60
313.08
334.35
2,980.44
3,380.38
1,328.60
295.50 (avg.)
360.97 (avg.)
503.85 (avg.)
Source: Choi 1997, 57.
chaebol system. Table 10 shows the levels of indebtedness in the Korean economy
in 1996.
Thus, the democratic transition led politicians to increase their demand for
political funds and hence led business to exert greater influence. Rapid expansion
was politically useful. Bigger has always been better in the Korean context, both as
a means of ensuring a continuous flow of funds to the companies and as a way for
entrepreneurs to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of Korea's fluid political
sphere.
Conclusion: Corruption and the Developmental State
Money politics has always been a central aspect of the pattern of Korean politics,
and this study has shown that we cannot assume benevolence on the part of the state.
This study has also cast doubt on the "hard" version of the developmental state.
Evidence of massive corruption undermines the argument that the state is neutral,
picks winners, and provides public goods because the civil service is insulated from
social influences. However, a more limited version of the developmental state
argues that governments can have a beneficial effect regardless of how the politics
of government action is attained. Korea did develop, and numerous studies have
shown how the Korean state acted in a number of developmental ways to provide
public goods and nurture investment. So how do we reconcile the politics and the
economics?
Money politics did not swamp development for three reasons. First, the mutual-
hostage situation in Korea was a key factor in keeping corruption from spinning out
of control. The bargain that the elites struck was collusive, not cooperative, and each
group took as much advantage of the other as possible. Yet the balance of power
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meant that neither the political elite nor the bureaucratic elite was able to gain a
decisive edge over the other. The process never spun out of control, because the
elites were vulnerable with respect to each other, and they were thus limited in their
ability to force their wishes on the other side. In addition, the smaller the number of
actors, and the less competitive the rent-seeking process, the lower the total costs
arising from the process.70 Competition for rents is not so great in situations
involving few actors, and thus resources are not necessarily expended in obtaining
rents. Much rent seeking entails competing with other actors to win rents and then
building entry barriers and other mechanisms to protect those rents. A group that has
exclusive access to the rent markets has lower information costs and can collude
over time with other rent seekers to lower costs.71 The implication from this is
straightforward: Having smaller numbers of rent seekers reduces the total social cost
because property rights over the rent are more secure.
Second, bribes are transfers. As such, corruption does not necessarily imply any
deadweight loss, and the political story I have told here does not necessarily affect
the overall provision of public goods.72 Corruption may indeed consist of struggles
over the distribution of state policy and goods rather than struggles over the absolute
level. Rent-seeking models assume a perfect "state of nature," where the govern-
ment does not interfere with economic activity. Yet in reality, every society already
has a distribution of rights that benefits some actors more than others, and thus
bribery related to rent seeking is itself a mechanism that could lead to a more
efficient distribution of rights than before. The relevant question is whether the
resources would be put to more productive use by the seeker or by the one being
sought, and theoretically only the lowest-cost firm could afford the highest bribe.73
None of this necessarily entails rent seeking that would distort economic efficiency:
If the transfer of wealth is from businessmen to politicians and it results in
productive investments, a nation may benefit even from machine-style politics.74
Finally, although the Korean state may have provided public goods and supported
investment, that may not be why those goods were provided. The Korean state
intervened in the way it did because to do so was in the interests of a small group
of business and political elites. Building roads, apartment complexes, and power
stations provides some public goods, but it also provides private goods. Access to
the private benefits of state resources was often contingent upon production of
public goods.75 Although Samsung and Daewoo accrued enormous private benefits
from having privileged access to state capital and policies, society benefited as well
from improved infrastructure, employment, and opportunities. My argument is
complementary to Alice Amsden's argument that the state exchanged subsidies for
70. Tullock 1988, 228.
71. Chang 1994, 120.
72. Khan 1997, 13.
73. Bardhan 1997, 1322.
74. See Khan 1996a,b; Doner and Ramsey 1997; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Theobald 1990; and
Klitgaard 1988.
75. See Olson 1982; and Broz 1997, 2-7.
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performance.76 The difference is that I provide a political story that explains the
patterns of exchange, and I also show that the process was based on money politics,
was heavily biased, and was not nearly as efficient as Amsden argues.
Thus, this study suggests that understanding even a developmental state requires
knowing the political story. The Korean state made many decisions that fostered
investment and growth over the past forty years, but politics played a major role.
Economic policy choice is only one of many issues with which political elites must
concern themselves. A political-economy explanation must focus closely on how
preferences emerge and on the institutions that direct the implementation of those
preferences. Such an explanation must be sensitive to the nature of the political
coalition that supported the elites, to resource constraints, and to the vulnerability
that elites faced. Given that elites must constantly be concerned about retaining
power, corruption and policy access can be powerful political tools.77
There are four main implications that arise from this analysis. First, the evidence
presented here shows that knowing the political story is essential to understanding
how the developmental state functions. I have shown how the needs of the elites
drove policymaking, created enormous graft, and patterned the political and eco-
nomic systems. It is this larger institutional environment, more than any specific
institution or policy, that previous scholarship has neglected.
Second, microanalytical explorations of political economy must increasingly be
balanced with an understanding of the larger institutional environment within which
actors operate. Focusing too closely on the details of party organization or institu-
tional configurations of the Economic Planning Board may cause scholars to lose
sight of the larger forces at play. Both approaches are valid, and they complement
each other.
Third, because the institutional arrangements and policy choices in individual
countries vary greatly, we must also avoid the temptation to look for a universal set
of arrangements or variables that will lead to growth or stagnation. This is not to
argue that development is a random process. We have a good understanding of some
of the variables, such as savings and education. But because Korea is one of the few
successful late developers, scholars need to carefully explore the role of less
analytically tractable variables, such as corruption. The evidence presented here
suggests that in order to understand the nature of policymaking in developing
countries, we must first understand the particular political challenges that individual
leaders face and the manner in which business attempts to influence government
policy. The strategic allocation of economic policy and benefits is an important
political resource.
Finally, my argument raises a number of new questions regarding the develop-
mental state and international relations. State-led industrialization transforms the
international division of labor, and state autonomy is often understood as necessary
76. Amsden 1989.
77. See Jomo and Gomez 1998; Weingast 1993, 287; and Root 1994.
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for this transformation. My argument, if it is correct, modifies our notion of state
autonomy and makes the rise of Korea even more puzzling. The domestic focus of
this article leads logically to the need to understand domestic-international linkages
that may have sustained the Korean state or may have allowed it to behave as it did
while still promoting growth. The current literature has emphasized an export-
oriented trade regime as being important for the state and for development.
However, I have shown that because Korea existed in a geopolitical situation that
made its survival and growth important for larger U.S. interests, understanding the
flow of international finance, the role of international institutions, and the role of
dominant actors in the international system is also consequential for understanding
Korea's development. A logical subsequent area for study is thus how and why these
larger, and somewhat neglected, international forces interacted with domestic
Korean politics. Growth with corruption is an issue that needs to be explained, and
until scholars directly address the issue of politics, our understanding of the political
economy of development will remain incomplete.
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